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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
000O000

JOHN GALLACHER,
Plaintiff and Respondent/
vs.
Case No. 870111-CA

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF SKIN
CARE AND JALAINE HANSEN,
Defendants and Appellants,
000O000

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
000O000

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal of a small claims judgment rendered in the
Eighth Circuit Court, Orem Department.

The action in the Small

Claims Court was commenced by the father of a student at the
school run by Defendants for a refund of tuition and other fees
paid.

The Court ordered a refund in the amount of $800.00.

Jurisdiction

is conveyed

on this Court to hear appeals by

Defendant from actions filed in a Small Claims Court by Section
78-6-10(2) U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows:
(a) Whether the Plaintiff in this action has any standing
to take legal action against Defendants and, if so, may he assert

a defense to a contract in behalf of his daughter, now ever 18
and able to bring her own action.
(b) Whether the contract made between Defendants and Sandie
Gallacher, the daughter of Plaintiff herein, is voidable, as
found by the Court below, because it was entered into by a minor.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELIED UPON
The following Statutory Provisions of the Utah Code and
rules of Civil Procedure

will be relied upon by Defendants in

support of their arguments:
15-2-1 U.C.A. Period of Minority
The period of minority extends in
females to the age of eighteen years; but
obtain their majority by marriage.
It
provided that courts in divorce actions
support to age 21.

males and
all minors
is further
may order

15-2-2 U.C.A.
Liability for Necessaries and on
Contracts - Disaffirmance.
A minor is bound not only for reasonable value of
necessaries but also by his contracts, unless he
disaffirms them before or within a reasonable time
after he attains his majority and restores to the other
party all money or property received by him by virtue
of said contracts and remaining within his control at
any time after attaining his majority.
15-2-3 U.C.A.
Limitation on Right to Disaffirm.
No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases
where, on account of the minor's own misrepresentations
as to his majority or from his having engaged in
business as adult, the other party had good reason to
believe the minor capable of contracting.
Rule 17 U.R.C.P.:

the

(a) Real Party in I n t e r e s t .
Every a c t i o n s h a l l be p r o s e c u t e d in t h e name of
real party
in i n t e r e s t .
An e x e c u t o r ,
2

administrator guardian, bailee, trustee of an express
trust/ a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in his own name without
joining with him the party for whose benefit the action
is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action
for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in
the name of the State of Utah. Mo action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the
same effect as if the action had been commenced in the
name of the real party in interest.
(b)

Infants or Incompetent Persons.
When an infant or an insane or incompetent person
is a party, he must appear either by his general
guardian, or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the
particular case by the court in which the action is
pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any
case when it is deemed by the court in which the action
or proceeding is prosecuted, expedient to represent the
infant, insane or incompetent person in the action or
proceeding, notwithstanding he may have a general
guardian and may have appeared by him. In an action in
rem it shall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad
litem for any unknown party who might be an infant or
an incompetent person.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant American University of Skin Care is a Utah

Corporation which operates a school of cosmetology in the State
of Utah.

Defendant Jalaine Hansen is not an officer or director

of the corporation, but is responsible
activities of the school.

for the day to day

Sandie Gallacher signed an agreement

with the school for the purpose of obtaining certain educational
classes from the school on January 8, 1987.
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Classes were to

commencef and did commence/ on January 13, 1987f the date of her
18th birthday.

No consideration for the contract was given on

January 8thf but Sandie Gallacher paid to Defendants a check for
$800.00/ signed by her father, on the the 13thf the date of her
birthday/ and the date of the beginning of class. On that datef
she was asked tof and did/ initial the contract indicating her
continued assent to the contract provisions/ and in particular to
the added provision that there would be no refunds for this
particular type of class.

Sandie commenced schooling as

scheduled/ and continued such schooling for two to three weeks.
Thereafter/ she became disenchanted/ and dropped out.

A demand

for a refund was made by Sandie's father/ the Plaintiff in this
actionf citing various reasons which may have constituted failure
of consideration or fraud/ and was denied the refund/ based upon
the initial contract.

Legal action was taken in the Small Claims

Court for the full refund at which time various allegations were
discussed.

The Court made no ruling in reference to any other

claim made by Plaintiff/ but ruled that the contract was made
prior to Sandie's 18th birthday/ and was voidable by Sandie.

The

Court therefore ordered a full refund of the amount paid under
the contract.

Sandie had received a "kit1* consisting of certain

items needed to complete the course.

The Court/ apparently

relying upon the statutes cited above/ ordered the kit returned
to Defendants.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendants make two specific arguments to the Court in
support of their prayer to reverse the lower court and remand for
further hearing.

Firstf Defendants allege that John Gallacher

was not a party to the contract and that he may therefore not be
a party to this legal action; or that if he is, he may not assert
his daughter's minority as a defense to the contract.
Defendants secondly ask this Court to rule that the lower
court erred in finding that the agreement signed by Sandie
Gallacher was in fact a contract signed before her eighteenth
birthday and therefore subject to being voided by the Court in
the action.

Defendants contend that the contract was actually

entered into at the time the money was paid and schooling was
commenced.

If the contract was actually entered into prior to

that time, the actions of Sandie Gallacher after her eighteenth
birthday were a ratification of the contract, taking it outside
of the action of the statute allowing voidability.
ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF IN THIS ACTION IS NOT A PARTY TO THE
CONTRACT AT ISSUE AND HAS NO STANDING TO BRING THIS
ACTION. IF PLAINTIFF IS A PROPER PARTY, HE MAY NOT
ASSERT MINORITY AS A CONTRACTUAL DEFENSE, AS HE IS
CLEARLY NOT A MINOR.
Rule 17 U.R.C.P. as cited above, states that the real party
and interest should be a party to a legal action.

If that person

is a minor, the court is to appoint a guardian ad litem to
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represent the interests of that person.

In this particular case,

a contract was entered into by a person who was, at the time of
the original signing, a minor.

Almost immediately thereafter,

however, that person achieved her majority.

She no longer needs

a guardian ad litem to protect her, and indeed must be a party to
this action if relief is to be granted.

The reason, apparently,

she has not been made a party is that her father gave her the
money, and it is him who wants his money back.

That does not

give him standing to enter into this legal action instead of his
daughter.
Supreme

His agreement was with her, not Defendants.
Court,

The Utah

in Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands and

Forestry, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986) stated that "...this court
will not lightly dispense with the requirement that a litigant
have a personal stake in the outcome of a specific dispute."

The

court there went on to say, in discussing standards of standing
to litigate:
The premises upon which these standards have been
constructed is that issues should generally be
litigated by those parties with the most direct
interest in resolution of those issues, ... 716 P. 2d
796.
The issue here is whether or not the contract, to which
Plaintiff was not a party, is voidable by a minor.

This

Plaintiff has no interest whatsoever in the resolution of that
issue.

Plaintiff is not a minor, and was not a minor for some

time prior to the contract.

Plaintiff has no legal right to

6

benefit from the provisions of the law regarding a minor's right
to void a contract.

In the case of Clark v. American Standard

Inc> 583 P.2d 618 (Utah 1978), the court ruled that a corporate
officer who had signed a contract in behalf of a corporation did
not have standing to enforce that contract.

The case was

remanded to the district court for a determination as to whether
the plaintiff could have qualified as a third party beneficiary,
with some interest in enforcing the contract.

In doing so, the

Supreme Court asked the Trial Court to make a determination of
whether the plaintiff was an "intended beneficiary" of the
contract at the time the contract was made, by both parties to
the contract.

Clearly, the fact that Sandie's father may have

given her the money for her schooling does not give rise to any
duty in Defendants to the father.

Clearly he is not a party to

the contract, and clearly he is not a beneficiary.
II.
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN SANDIE GALLACHER AND
DEFENDANTS WAS NOT VOIDABLE UNDER STATUTE BECAUSE OF
HER MINORITY.
Admittedly, Sandie Gallacher, at the time she originally
signed her schooling agreement with Defendants was under the age
of 18 years.

She had no capacity to contract, outside narrow

exceptions.

Defendants do not claim that this contract falls

within those exceptions.

This contract, however, provided for

the payment of an $800.00 tuition fee, (including a registration
fee and a fee for materials) by Sandie Gallacher and the
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provision of certain educational services by Defendants.

The

contract, by its terms, was to commence on January 13, 1986,
Sandie's 18th birthday.

On her 18th birthday, Sandie returned to

Defendant's place of business with her check.

She was told at

that time if she intended to go through with the contract that
she would have to agree to a no refund policy, due to particular
circumstances of the services which would be provided.

She was

asked to initial the contract again, where the alteration had
been made on that date, indicating her assent to the additional
term.

She did so, and paid the money at that time.

date, she commenced her schooling.

On that

She continued her schooling

for a period of two or three weeks, before deciding that it was
not what she wanted, and dropping out.

It is the contention of

Defendants that the contract was actually made on her 18th
birthday, and was not voidable based on minority.

On that date,

Sandie paid the money and started the schooling.

It should be

from that date that the contract be deemed effective.
Utah Case Law on this point is basically non-existent.

The

Court of Appeals of the State of Colorado, however, in Jones v.
Dressell, 586 P.2d 1057 (Colo. App. 1978) made the following
statement:
It is well settled in Colorado that a contract entered
into by a minor is not void but only voidable by the
minor. Affirmance is not merely a matter of intent; it
may be determined by the actions of a minor who accepts
the benefits of a contract after reaching the age of
majority, or by his silence or acquiescence in the
8

contract for a considerable length of

time.

Thus, on reaching the age of eighteen plaintiff was
required either to disaffirm the contract within a
reasonable time, or be bound thereby. And, the
undisputed facts established that, after turning
eighteen, plaintiff did not only disaffirm the
contract, but instead ratified it by accepting the
benefits thereof. Hence, his being a minor when he
entered the contract is without significance as to its
present enforceability against him. (Citations omitted)
582 P.2d at 1058.
That case was later affirmed
Colorado in Jones v. Dressellr

by the Supreme Court of

623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981) in

affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
added:
We agree that what constitutes a reasonable time for
affirmance or disaffirmance is ordinarily a question of
fact to be determined by the facts in a particular
case. We conclude, however, that the trial court
properly determined that Jones ratified the contract,
as a matter of law, by accepting the benefits of the
contract when he used Free Flight's facilities on
October 19, 1974.
Thus, since Jones ratified the contract, the factual
issues of whether his suit for personal injuries was
filed within a reasonable time after attaining his
majority and constituted disaffirmance of the contract,
is not relevant. Accordingly, the entry of summary
judgment on the issue of ratification was not error.
623 P.2d at 374.
Whatever time the contract was entered, it is clear that
Sandie Gallacher ratified the contract after the date of her
eighteenth birthday.

She paid the money at that time, she

commenced study at that time, and continued

study for a

substantial period of time after her eighteenth birthday.
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Upon

deciding that she did not like the school, she cannot run back to
the time before the contract, and claim she was too young to
enter into it.
CONCLUSION
Defendants ask the Court to rule that the lower court herein
was in error in its ruling that the contract entered into between
Sandie Gallacher and American University
voidable.

of Skin Care was

If it was voidable, it cannot be voided by her father,

a person who has no interest in such voidability.
Upon such a ruling, Plaintiff's action should be dismissed.
As an alternative to dismissal, the matter should be remanded to
the Trial Court for further hearing on other issues not ruled
upon by that court.
DATED this
lis

L
/(

.

day of Jrr
aire,
rre', 1987.
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, JENSEN & IVINS

tdZhtL

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Appellantsi
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of -*u*e/l987r I did

mail ir^o true and correct copies of the above and foregoing
Request for Production of Documents, postage prepaid, to John
Gallacher, Attorney pro se, 1510 North 230 East, Logan, Utah
84321.
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